Trends in software reliability for digital flight control by Hecht, H. & Hecht, M.
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 
of the material. However, it is the best reproduction available from the original 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19830015923 2020-03-21T04:39:13+00:00Z
.- A
NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT 166456
(is sD A-CR-166456)	 TRENDS IN SOFZ p ARF	 N83-24 194
F.%1 *, ,^%BILITY f0B DIGITAL FLIGHT CCK'IFOL
( :7^.rr JrR , Inc.)	 23 p H'": A02/CF AC 1	 CSCL 09B
Onclas
G3/61 09977
Trends"In Software Reliability for Digital Flight Control
H. Hecht
M. Hecht
CONTRACT--P.O. A93024B
April 1983
NASA
NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT 15 54 56
ORIMNAL PAGE K-1
OF	 QUALIVY
Trends in Software Reliability for Digital Flight Control
Herbert Hecht
Myron Hecht
SOI-HAR INCORPORATED
Los Angeles, CA 90035
Prepared for
Ames Research Center
Under P.O. A93024B
PJASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California 94035
M
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
.4.
Section
	
Subject	 Page
1. Requirements for Software Reliability . . . . . 	 1
2. Scope and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . .
	
2
3. Analysis of Fault Densities . . . . . . . . . .	 6
4. Fault Classification	 . . . . . . . . . . . . .	 10
5. Utilization of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . .	 14
6. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Reterences .	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 17
Appendix - Data Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
r;
i'
ORIGIMAL PAGE 19'
OF POOR QUA iT'Y
SECTION i r REQUIREMENTS FOR SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Digital flight controls are assuming an increasingly important role in the
operation of passenger aircraft. At present they are essential for only some
flight phases, such as automatic landing. But greater dependence on automatic
stabilization can provide increased fuel economy and speed, and thus there is a
need to provide freedom from failures (Including software failures) throughout
the flight regime. These developments are already quite visible in military
aircraft where automatic stabilization is essential for safety of flight in
major portions of the flight regime.
Aircraft components essential to safety of flight are subject to FAA
regulations, and compliance with these must be established in order to obtain a
Certificate of Fllghtworthiness. As automatic flight controls become essential,
they must comply with these requirements, the most important one of which Is
that any failure condition that would be catastrophic (to the aircraft) is
extremely improbable [FAA70]. An advisory circular equates $extremely
improbable' with an expected failure frequency of 1E-9 per flight or flight hour
(according to some interpretations this may require a failure frequency of less
than 1E-10 per hour).
Since compliance must be demonstrated during a period when at most several
thousand hours of flight time can be accumulated, demonstration of adequacy on
the basis of observed failure frequency is completely impossible. For the
hardware components, established methods of quantitative reliability analysis
and fault tolerance are used to satisfy the requirements. The basis for such
procedures In the software area is much more problematic, and a purpose of this
report Is to direct attention to improvements in analysis and software systems
synthesis that may overcome the existing deficiencies. Present software for the
limited extent of essential applications is usually certified by demonstrating
that only a very restricted set of potentially catastrophic malfunctions may
occur, and that there are checks or circumvention programs provided to guard
against these. This practice is not believed to be applicable to future broader,
applications of digital flight controls.
...
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SECTION 2 - SCOPE AND DATA SOURCES
It Is Intended fo describe the state of software reliability for digital flight
controls in the recent past and at present In quantitative and qua il+ative
terms, to Identify t?-ends, and to point to approaches that promise further
improvements and that may lead to a comprehensive certification methodology.
Because very few reports on the reliability of flight control software have been
published, data from a broader field of software applications Is examined, and
the few available datapoints from the flight controls field are discussed in the
context of the general findings and trends. The present study Is divided into
two parts: a numerical evaluation of reliability and reliability trends, and an
investigation of causes of software failures that has both quantitative and
qualitative aspects.
The emphasis Is on presenting findings that may lead to improvements in:
Software development methodology
Test methodology
Application of software fault tolerance
Quantification of software reliability
Data collection and analysis
The data sources utilized and some of 'their characteristics are summarized in
Table 1. The first three entries in the table provide data for the numerical
reliability assessment, and the last two entries together with the first one
provide data for the evaluation of causes of software failures. The total
database represented by these comprised 47 programs. Data for 28 programs in
that set were sufficiently complete to permit the detailed analysis presented In
this report. Significant characteristics of these programs are summarized in
the Appendix (Table A).
TABLE 1 - DATA SOURCES
Source No. of. Program Fault Fault
Programs Size Density* Types
Ames (Set 1) 15 391k 0.64% Yes
Ames/(Set 2) 2 89k 0.52% No
Goddard-SEL 11 812k 0.10% No
Langley/MIPS 1 90k N/A Yes
RADC/TRW 3 > 1 0000k N/A Yes
* Faults per equivalent executable assembly statement
The first entry comprises data from software development for the B-1 bomber and
the air launched cruise missile (ALCM). The data were collected for NASA Ames
and include some flight control and closely related programs (air data computer
and navigation) [PRES81]. The Set 2 data were also collected for NASA Ames in a
special effort to assist in the identification of failure modes in digital
flight controls [ROCK81]. The two programs relate to automatic flight controls
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and aircraft navigation, respectively. The NASA Goddard Software Engineering
Laboratory (SEL) data were acquired partly from the agency itself and partly
from the Data and Analysis Center for Software (DACS) at the Rome Air
Development Canter (RADC). These programs deal primarily with satellite
telemetry and ground control of satellites [BAS177, CARD82, TURN811. The fourth
entry comprises data collected under a NASA Langley contract during the
development of the software for the Metric Integrated Processing System (MiPS)
and Vandenburg Air Force Base. The specific program generates sensor
calibration and other initialization parameters for a missile Launch monitoring
application [HECH773. The last dataset comes from a report prepared by TRW for
RADC. The programs deal with satellite and missile applications [THAY761
Throughout this report program size Is expressed in equivalent executable
assembly statements. For programs written in most high order languages (HOLs)
the number of executable statements Is muitipIIed by flue to arrive at the
assembly equivalent. This represents a conservative assumption for the
hypothesis that the fault density in HOL programs is lower than In assemb!y
programs that will be presented below. Analyses of the expansion on a CDC 7600
FORTRAN compiler indicate an expansion factor of eight [LAWS76]. For programs
written in AED a conversion factor of three Is used which is derived from a
specific analysis of the programs involved here. Practically all data come from
formal test programs, I. e., from the time between unit or module test and
operational use of a program.
By combining data from several sources some biases are probably Introduced Into
this study due to differences in failure reporting, thoroughness of testing, and
maturity of programs when data collection terminated. Some auxiliary analyses
are therefore carried out within a given sample to determine whether the overall
findings hold. However, the ensemble of the programs provides a good basis for
studying broad trends which are our primary objective.
In order to address the FAA requirements It is desirable to express software
reliability in terms of failure rate (failures per unit execution time) which
then can be compared with the numerical criterion In the advisory circular.
This measure was not available for the programs of primary concern in this
study. The readily obtainable numerical index for reliability was the fault
density (faults per equivalent executable assembly statement). This is the
quantity used as the reliability measure in this report, usually expressed as a
percentage. By means of an f uncovery factor #
 (the number of executions required
to detect a fault) the fault density can in theory be converted to a failure
rate but there are at present no generally accepted values for the uncovery
factor [MUSA79].
Standard definitions of reliability terms are used in this report [IEEE82].
Specifically:
e15
Failure - The inability of a s y stem or component to perform a required function
within specified limits. A failure may be produced when a fault Is encountered.
Fault - An accidental condition that causes a functional unit to fail to perform
its required function.
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Error - A discrepancy be#ween a computed, observed, or measured value or
condition and the true, specified, or theoretically correct value or condition.
Thus, a fault causes a failure which is usually observed because of the error
that results. In the investigation of causes of failures we will discuss fault
tggories although the looser term $ error category' is also recognized in
[IEEF.82]. The relationship between these terms is indicated In Figure 1. An
example of the application of these concepts to digital flight control software
may be represented by the following: an attitude calculation routine lacks
protection against division by zero (this is the fault); a zero divisor is
encountered (this is the trigger); and this results in an incorrect attitude
output (the error). The coincidence of the fault and the trigger for that fault
causes the failure. Reliability studies are concerned with the recording and
avoidance of failures, and, as mentioned above, the preferred Index of
reliability is the failure rate. Since it was not possible to compute this for
most of the programs in the data base, the analysis presented In the following
section makes use of the fault density which represents a rough relative index
of reliability.
.04
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FIGURE 1 - BASIC RELIABILITY MODEL
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SECTION 3 - ANALYSIS OF FAULT DENSITIES
The trend of fault density with year of program start for all software from the
first three sources In Table 1, Is shown In Figure 2. The fault density for
each start year represents the total number of faults divided by the total
number of statements in the corresponding programs. it Is thus a weighted
average rather than the mean of the fault densities of Individual programs. The
weighted average is used In all comparisons that involve groups of programs
throughout this report. The trend curve is also fitted by weighting each data
point with the associated number of statements The faults that are considered
here are those that resulted in errors or improper program execution. in some
studies the number of software problem reports (SPRs) is used as an index of
software quality. Since a problem report may be generated to require a
documentation change, or to add a feature now desired by a user but not part of
the ;,rlginal requirements, the total numbr of SPRs is not a good metric for
reliability studies.
Because of the wide scatter of the points, no statistical measures of
significance are appropriate. However, for programs started in 1977 the fault
density is seen to be considerably reduced. The period between 1975 and 1977
saw much increased emphasis on software engineering (a disciplined approach to
software development) and on the use of software tools (software programs that
assist In the development or test of other programs). Also, HOLs came Into much
wider use curing that period, and the effect of this Is discussed separately
below.
The contrast between pre-1977 software and more recent programs is further
examined In Table 2. Although there is a considerable overlap in the range of
fault densities observed for the to starting periods, there is an obvious trend
"o reduced fault density for the recent starts. The fault density of the flight
control programs Is below that of the whole group for pre-1972 starts but
appreciably above the group average for the recent starts. Reasons for this
latter deviation are discussed In connection with language use below. In either
period the flight control programs are well within the range of the other
programs.
TABLE 2 - EFFECT OF STARTING PERIOD ON FAULT DENSITY
Program
	 Pre-1977	 Recent
Attribute
No, of programs	 7	 21
HOL usage	 14%	 71%
Program size*
	
67k	 1,224k
Fault density	 1.59%
	
0.22%
Flight controls	 1.19%	 0.72%
Range of f. d.
	 0.63% - 11.66%	 0.01% -- 5.21%
* '•,vlvalent executable assembly statements
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The great Increase in the use of HOLs during the recent period could be the
significant cause for the Improvement in reliability. Therefore a separate
analysis of the effect of starting period on assembly programs is presented in
Table 3. Although the reduction In fault density for recent starts is not as
pronounced as for the total sample In Table 2, It is still present and can be
seen In both the average and the range. Thus, the effects of discipllnad
software practices seem to have carried over even Into assembly language
programming. A similar comparison for HOL programs could not be constructed
because only a single HOL program had been started prior to 1977.
TABLE 3 - EFFECT OF STARTING PERIOD ON FAULT DENSITY OF ASSEMBLY PROGRAMS
wk
Program
Attribute
No. of programs
Program size*
Fault density
Range of f. d.
Pre-1977
6
34k
2.20%
0.63% - 11.66%
Recent
6
100k
1.0311
0.15% - 5.21%
*Executable assembly Instructions
It is also of interest to examine -the effect of language within a given time
period. For this purpose the 21 programs that were started In 1977 and later
are analyzed in Table 4. it is seen that HOL usage does indeed account for a
very major reduction In fault density. The standard deviation of fault density
among the HOL programs is 0.21. The difference between assembly and HOL
programs is therefore in excess of four standard deviations (p < 0.005). The
inequality presented in parentheses is an abbreviated notation to denote that
the probability that such a Large difference is due to chance events is less
than 0.005. This notation is used repeatedly In this report to indicate the
statistical confidence In selected findings.
The flight control programs have a higher than average fault density In each
language classification, and particularly for the HOL group where their average
is almost 2 standard deviations above that for the group as a whole. The two
HOL flight control programs involved here are written in AED and were started in
1977 and 1978. Both the early starting date and the use of a Language for which
few program and test support facilities exist may account for the deviation.
.f.
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Program
Attribute
No. of programs
Program size*
Fault density
Flight controls
Assembly
	
HOL
6	 15
100k	 1,124k
1.58	 0.52
Range of f. d.	 0.15% - 5.21%
	
0.01% - 0.86%
* Equivalent executable assembly statements
As mentioned earlier, there Is concern that the conclusions drawn from these
comparisons might be biased due to the combination of data from several sources.
The Goddard/SEL programs are all written In HOL and are in the recent group.
These programs are also at the low end of the fault density range. Within the
programs from this source there is no significant trend with respect to starting
date or HOL use (some programs include assembly sections but these are typically
less than 10% of the total code). To remove possible bias due to the
combination of sources, the Ames (Set 1) data are analyzed separately in Table
5. Although this is a smaller sample, the same effects are apparent, and thus
these do not appear to be artifacts introduced by combining data from several
sources. (The figures In parentheses under each entry in the table represent the
number of programs and the total size).
TABLE 5 - FAULT DENSITY FOR AMES (SET 1) PROGRAMS
Starting FAULT DENSITY IN PERCENT
Period Language:	 Assembly HOL Both
Pre-1977 2.20 0.96 1.59
(6„ 340 (10 330 (7, 67k)
Recent 1.04 0.175 0.44
(6 0
 11000 (2, 224k) (8 0 3240
Both 1.33 0.276 0.638
(12,	 134k) (3, 257k) (15, 391k)
It Is seen that the reduction in fault density for recent starting dates and use
of HOL carries over not only for this sample as a whole but also for each
subgroup within it (HOL effects for each starting category, startling date
effects for each HOL category), thus lending further credence to the conclusions
stated earlier. From the analysis of the fault density data It appears that use
of high order languages has a very pronounced beneficial effect on software
reliability, and this finding can be translated directly into the selection of
the programming environment for flight control software and for similar critical
applications. The effect of starting dates can be Interpreted as reflecting
4dl^ k ^^l^v ^' 1 k"a	 - ^ e
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disciplined software development (structured programming, hierarchical
structure, smail module sizes, etc.) and better test technology, but it may also
be due to some other factors. Further studies of this effect are warranted. In
the meantime, we can be satlsfled that whatever we may have been doing during
the past flue years in our approach to software development hes proved to be
beneficial.
For a number of programs the data sources also provided Information on the
professional labor hours expended during development. The following analysis is
restricted to 13 programs written predominantly in a HOL,, and most of these come
from the Goddard/SEL source. Four of these programs present pre-1977 starts,
and the remaining nine were started more recently. A plot of fault density vs.
programming hours per statement is shown in Figure 3. The heavy line represents
the weighted (by program size) linear regression for the entire population. The
lighter IIne Is the linear regression for the recent programs only. Although
the scatter is wide and other factors obviously have a strong effect on fault
density, there Is a pronounced negative trend (I. e., high programmer effort
reduces the fault density). For both populations there is extremely high
contidence that the slope is negative (p < 0.001). It would be interesting to
test whether this relationshp still holds for effort above some threshold (e.
g., above 2 hours/statement) but the amount of data available was not sufficient
for a meaningful analysis.
4. FAULT I LXA" I ^" i LiAT I ON
In spite of the encouraging results reported in the previous section, It must
also be admitted that the overall results of the fault density analysis leave us
far short of the reliability goals for essential flight controls. In order to
apply remedial efforts effectively, the causes of faults in some of the software
identified in Table 1 will now be examined.
A classlflcation of causes of software faults was generated in a 1976 RADC
sponsored study that examined several very large software programs [THAY76].
Because of the considerable effort that went Into that study, and because fault
distributions that were published In It presented a unique basis for comparison,
this classification (or adaptations of It) have been carried over into most of
the succeeding literature that examined software faults. Unfortunately, these
classifications are not very satisfactory for describing software malfunctions
In the context of FAA certification requirements where a classification by
effect (error as defined above) would be more significant. Also, to ,judge the
potential for catastrophic outcomes, it Is desirable to now the purpose of the
routine that the fault is located in (e.g., a fault In a cheduler has greater
likelihood of serious consequences than a fault In an Internal recordkeeping
module). None of this Information Is available in either the data specifically
examined here nor in any other data source that has come to the attention of the
authors. It is also noted that the Identification and separate analysis of
flight control software data represents a unique aspect of the present report.
In spite of these shortcomings, the existing classification scheme provides
Insights into the deficiencies in the programming environment that lead to
faults, and by Inference therefore points to avenues for eliminating causes of
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faults. The data collected specifically for this study provided ten major
categories and additional subcategories which were utilized only to a limited
extent. The original categories are shown In the left side of Table 6. To
permit comparison with other data collections, some categories were combined as
shown in the right column of the table. All of the following discussion will be
In terms of the revised classification.
...
12
TABLE 6
Original Classification
A. Computational errors
B. Logic errors
C. Data input errors
D. Data handling errors
E. Data output errors
F. Interface errors
G. Data definition errors
H. Data bane errors
J. Other errors
K. Unknown
- FAULT CLASSIFICATION
Revised Classification
a. Computational errors (A)
b. Logic errors (B)
c. Data 1/0 errors (C+D+E)
d. Interface d execution errors (F+J)
e. Data base/global variables (G+H)
Over 3600 faults from 22 programs were classified in this manner. SrAne, but not
all, of these programs were those for which fault density distributions were
discussed above. Three of the programs were related to digital flight controls.
The results of this classification are shown in the first three numerical
columns of Table 7. The remaining columns of this table contain equivalent data
from other projects. The MIPS program comprises about 25k FORTRAN statements,
dealing with launch data preparation and calibration for a missile tracking
system. The program was developed between 1975 and 1977 but Includes some
portions from earlier programs. The TRW data come from the previously
referenced RADC report. TRW 2 comprises 97k of JOVIAL J4 code dveloped in the
early 1970s and Is intended for batch processing. TRW 3 consists of over 115k
JOVIAL J4 statements, likewise intended for batch processing, and developed
slightly later than TRW 2. A significant fact about TRW 3 is that about
one-quarter of the code was supplied by other contractors. TRW 4 Is a general
information processing system that can operate either on-line or In batch mode.
It is written In a macro-languge, PWS, and the exact size is not stated. It is
a large program, consisting of 190 different routines.
The flight control software data are presented in three columns in Table 7. The
first of these Is labeled I raw' and contains data as reported. The second
column (Adj. 1) contains an adjustment which transfers data scaling faults from
the Data 1/0 category to Computational. In the third column a further
adjustment is made to move faults related to flags from the Data 1/0 to the
Logic classification. The reason for those adjustments is explained in the
discussion of the table.
ORIGINAL PAGE i9
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TABLE 7 - RESULTS OF FAULT CLASSIFICATION
PERCENT OF ALL CLASSIFIED FAULTS
Class Ames (Set 1) Langley/ TRW 2 TRW3 TRW4
Total Flight Controls MIPS
Raw Adj.	 1 Adj.2
a. Computation 7.4 10.0 17.3 17.3 4.2 17.2 11.5 2.4
b. Logic 47.1 26.7 26.7 35.6 66.3 27.2 30.5 47.5
c. Data 1/0 15.8 32.3 25.0 16.0 10.7 16.6 23.4 12.2
d. Interf. etc. 16.2 14.5 14.5 14.5 15.6 20.1 20.2 25.8
e. Data base 13„5 16.5 16.5 16.5 3.3 18.8 14.4 12.2
Comparisons among the elements of a row show sizeable differences (e. g., the
percentage of computational errors ranging from 2.4$ to 17.316) but the projects
as a whole show surprisingly good agreement in the distribution of faults among
the classifications. With the exception of the 'Raw' flight controls programs
from the present sample, logic faults are the largest class. Da lit 1/0 errors
are mostly in the second or third largest category.
In the 'raw ►
 classification of faults for the Ames Flight Control programs,
scaling errors were assigned to the Data 1/0 category. In most of the other
data sources such errors are considered under computation ('Units Conversion
Error $ in [THAY763). In the column headed 'Flight Controls, Adj. 1 1 these
faults (incorrect scaling) were transferred from the Data 1/0 to the Computation
classification. Even after this adjustment, Data 1/0 faults constitute an
unusually high percentage, and logic faults an unusually low percentage, of all
faults. A major contributor to this is a large fraction of flag setting faults
(flags not reset, not properly set, etc.). There is precedent in [THAY76] for
classifying these as Data 1/0 faults but it must be recognized that In terms of
tools and methodology that can be utlIIzed to uncover these they are closely
related to logic faults. Usually Incorrect handling of flags does not
constitute a very large fraction of the faults, and this possibly inconsistent
classification does not present a problem. When flag related faults are
classified as Logic (in the Adj. 2 column), the pattern becomes much more
consistent with that observed in the other data collections. Further
investigation of the high percentage of flag related faults In this data set
appears warranted. Interface and execution errors show considerable uniformity
among all the data sources.
The total sample compiled as part of this study (first numerical column) shows a
distribution among the fault classifications that is well within the range of
those of the previously reported efforts (all of which had pre-1977 start dates,
with most representing 1970 - 75 starts). There appears to be no basis for
attributing changes in the distribution of faults among the categories to
changes in the programming environment.
The total sample contained five programs that were written in a HOL, four that
..
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were mixed (between 25$ and 75$ assembly), and 12 that were primarily written In
assembly language. The fault classification for these three language groups Is
shown in Table 8. The percentage of computational faults is greater in the HOL
programs which might be expected because these frequently deal with more complex
algorithms. The percentage of logic faults Is greater in mixed and assembly
programs but the Increase is not of a magnitude that would indicate a definite
trend. The selection of language does not seem to have a major effect on the
distribution of faults among the major classifications.
TABLE 8 - FAULT CLASSIFICATION BY LANGUAGE
PERCENT OF ALL CLASSIFIED FAULTS
Class HOL Mixed Assembly
a. Computation 11,6 6.9 5.9
b. Logic 43.7 47.9 47.4
c. Data 1/0 17.3 17.0 15.0
d. Interf. etc. 15.9 14.4 17.4
e. Data base 11.4 13.9 14.2
The limitations of this classification must be acknowledged. It is widely
recognized that mistakes made in the very early phases of the development
process are the most costly ones t9 remedy and frequently have the most severe
consequences [BOEH76]. Hence, ideal ftcation of the development phase during
which the fault originated should be an integral part of a fault classification
scheme and use of such information in subsequent analysis should be extremely
useful. Because of the Judgement that is involved in this assessment most
investigators have not pursued this subject. It was attempted to supply this
information during the collection of some of the data analyzed here but this
took place four to five years after the fault had been detected and did not
produce consistent results. Data on the origin of faults (by development phase)
are therefore not presented here although the importance of such data is fully
acknowledged.
5. UTILIZATION OF FINDINGS
One of the problems of utilizing fault density as an index of software
reliability 1s that it measures past events. One could even argue that a high
number of faults detected during tests indicates that few remain as the program
enters the operational phase. However, most practitioners know that there is a
continuity to the fault detection process, and that a high rate of problems in
one phase is usually associated with an above average rate in succeeding phases.
An Important improvement in the interpretation of the fault density data is to
segregate and emphasize faults that occur in the final test phase because these
constitute a better index of what might be expected in operation. Even with all
these deficiencies, the data reviewed here make it unlikely that an average
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flight control program is free of faults when it enters the operational phase.
The data also show a wide variation in fault densities, with flight control
programs being frequently In the upper part of that range (cf. Table 4). This
indicates that much improvement Is possible by intensive use of existing
methodology.
The use of high order language seems to be an easily attainable means of
improving the reliability of flight control programs or others that are involved
in critical applications. Beyond this, the available Information does not
identify specific processes but It does indicate In a general way that the
adoption of disciplined development methodology that took place in the 1975 -
1977 time frame redu,' es the fault content of programs (see Tables 3 and 5).
That further improvements through intensive use of this methodology are possible
seems to be borne out by the significantly lower fault density of the
Goddard-SEL programs (see Table 1). That environment has encouraged full use of
advances In software engineering, and several programs from this group were at
the low limit of fault density encountered here (0.0116). Further studies to
isolate the benefits of individual tools or methodologies are obviously
Indicated.
That software tools can play an important part in the reduction of program
faults before they reach test Is strongly indicated by the high percentage of
logic, data base, and data 1/0 faults (Table 7). In the Ames (Set 1) sample,
these three categories accounted for over 75% of all faults. Many of these can
be avoided by the use of static analyzers, set/use listings, data dictionaries,
and similar readily available tools. The high percentage of data 1/0 faults In
flight control programs suggests emphasis on tools for mechanizing the review of
data interchange with a program.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
Collection of failure rate data, particularly tied to execution time, Is
essential in order to obtain a software reliability measure that can be directly
compared with the FAA certification requirements. Many examples for the
collection of such data are available [HECH77, MUSA793.
The data should be segregated by test phases or time in operational status so
that improvements in reliability with time can be determined. To permit the
identification of beneficial methodologies and tools, these data should be
supplemented by a full description of the development, test, and operational
environments.
The classification of faults and errors needs to be considerably modified In
order to address flight control concerns. It must provide a basis for
associating error types (by type of manifestation and severity) with fault types
(logic, etc. as used above) so that emphasis can be placed on eliminating those
faults that have the greatest potential for causing catastrophic failures. The
recording of the function (e.g., computational routine, 1/0 routine, scheduler)
that is affected by each failure is also of importance. The full benefits of
failure reports are seldom achieved if a thorough analysis is not performed at
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the time the failure occurs and the correction is made. At that time, the
Information is fresh and individuals involved In the detection and correction
process are available. Much more effort Is needed In both developing and
implementing improved methods of failure reporting. A more meaningful
identification of the development phase during which the fault arose may also be
achieved by those efforts.
Attention has recently been called to the effect of workload (the fraction of
computer processing capability utilized) on failure frequency of computers
ECAST82 0 IYER823. 'this suggests that (a) workload be considered as a failure
inducing element In any reliability analysis to demonstrate compliance with the
FAA requirements, and (b) that the prevailing workload be recorded in failure
reports to permit further study of this phenomenon.
It is recognized that most flight control software failures will not have
catastrophic effects on the safety of the aircraft. Yet, the relationship
between frequency and severity of failures is largely unexplored. An
investigation of failures in the Bell No. 4 Electronic Switching System (ESS)
suggests that there is an inverse relation between frequency and severity (I.
e., failures that caused the longest service interruption occurred least
frequently) [DAV181]. Whether this holds i,ue for flight control software
failures needs to be established. if such a relation exists in a general sense,
then certification could be based on the frequency of occurrence of mild
failures, a much more readily observable quantity.
To meet the needs of reliable software for critical applications in the
imm9dIate future, the application of fault tolerance techniques appears
essential, not as an alternative to efforts at Improving the quality of
individual programs but rather as a supplement to such efforts. Several methods
for implementing software fault tolerance have been described in the literature
[RAND75, CHEN78, HECH793. All require multiple, Independent versions of a
program but there are differences In the manner in which the Independence is
achieved and in the error detection mechanism. Even with allowance for less
than perfect operation of the fault tolerance provisions, these approaches can
reduce the software failure rate by several orders of magnitude. Thus, It may
be possible to demonstrate compliance with the FAA requirements by showing that
an individual program has a catastrophic failure rate of less than 1E-6 0 and
that fault tolerance provisions reduce the system catastrophic failure rate to
less than 1E-9 per flight hour.
ORIGiNAL PAGEE
 GJ
OF POOR QUALrTY
17
REFERENCES
BAS 177
	 V. R. Baslll et al., "The Software Engineering Lcboratory", University
of Maryland TR-535, May 1977
SOEH76 B. W. Boehm, "Software Engineering", ,JJU Trans. Q, Com2uters, vol C-25
no 12 pp 1226-1241, Dec 1976
CARD82	 D. N. Card and F. E. McGarry, "The Software Engineering Laboratory",
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, SEL-81-104, February 1982
CAST82	 X. Castillo and D. Slewlorek, "A Workload Dependent Software
Reliability Prediction Model", Digest. FTCS_12, pp 279-286, June 1982
CHEN76 L. Chen and A. Avizienis, "N-Version Programming: A Fault Tolerance
Approach to Reliability of Software Operation", Digest  2J PAu,
ETCS-8, pp 3-9. June 78
DAV181 E. A. Davis and P. K. Giloth, "No. 4 ESS: Performance Objectives and
Service Experience", EeII System Technical Journal, vol 60 no 6 pp
1203-1224, Aug 1981
FAA70
	 Federal Aviation Administration, Amendment 25-23 to Federal Aviation
Regulations, Part 25, 1970.
HECH79	 H. Hecht, "Fault Tolerant !software", lfa Trans. 2-n geltablltty, vol
R-28 no 3 pp 227-232, Aug 1979
HECH77	 H. Hecht, W. A. Sturm and S. Trattner, "Reliability Measurement During
Software Development", NASA Langley CR-145205, Sep 1977
IYER82	 R. K. lyer and D. J. Rosettl, "A Statistical Load Dependency Model for
CPU Errors at SLAC", Digest. FTCS-12, pp 363-372, June 1982
LAWS76 John D. Lawson, "Process Design Engineering Program, Baseline Software
Process Productivity and Error Analysis", prepared by Texas Instruments
Inc. for BMD Advanced Technology Center under Contract DAH60-72-C-0156,
April 1976
MUSA79	 J. D. Musa, "Validity of the Execution Time Theory of Software
Reliability", 1M Trans. 2a Reltabilit;, vol R-28 no 3 pp 181-191, Aug
79
RAND75 B. Randel1. "System Structure for Software Fault Tolerance", JEFF Proc.
ga Software Enalnneering, vol SE-1 no 2 pp 220-232, June 1975
ROCK81
Rockwell-Collins, "Software Error Study", Contract NAS2-27495, Collins
Avionics Division, 1981.
THAY76
	 T. A. Thayer et al., "Software Reliability Study", Contract
F30602-74-C-0036, TRW Defense and Space Systems Group, Mar 76
TURN81	 C. Turner et al., "The NASA/SEL Data Compendium", DACS, April 1981
..,
C)RIG P AL RA02P I'M
OF pOCM QE1AL11"I	 18
APPEND I X — DATA SIMWY
A summary of the data utilized in the analysis of fault densities (Section 3) Is
shown In Table A. The 28 projects listed in the table were selected from about
50 projects which were originally included in the study. The deleted projects
had incomplete data in one or more of the following categories which were
essential for the principal analyses carried out in this report:
Year of start
Number of executable statements
Number of faults
Primary programming language
As Is apparent in the table, the selected programs were; frequently deficient in
other data, and this, caused some secondary analyses In the report to be based on
a smaller population.
The following explanations apply to Table A:
PROJ NAME - Project designation, not necessarily descriptive, intended only to
show the general origin of the software. The numbers appended to the NASA
Goddard data correspond to the Project Number In the SEL data base.
ORG - Origin of the data: 1 = NASA Ames dataset 1, 2 = NASA Ames dataset 2,
N = NASA Goddard Software Engineering Laboratory
START YR - Year of start of the prgram development
END YR - Year program development was completed
PGMR HRS - Programmer hours devoted to development, an entry of 0 Indicates
missing data
MGMT, O TH HRS - Management and other classification hours devoted to
development, an entry of 0 indicates missing data
EXEC STMTS - Equl:nlent executable assembly statements as explained on p. 3
FAULTS - Number of faults reported for this project
PRiM LANG Primary programming language. The following abbreviations are used:
ASM - assembly language, COB - COBOL, FORT IV - FORTRAN IV, SFOR - S-FORTRAN
$ - Percent of executable statements In primary language, an en •i y of 0.00
indicates missing data, an entry of 99.99 indicates that all statements were In
the primary language
SEC LANG - Secondary Language. Abbreviations as under PRIM LANG; UNK indicates
that it is not known whether a secondary language was used
ORIOWAL
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$ - As under PRIM LANG
FAULT D.N S - Fault density as explained on p. 3
TABLE A -- DATA SUMMARY
PROJ NAME ORE START END PGMR HRS MGMT, EXEC FAULTS PRIM LANG % SEC LANG % FAULT
YR YR OTH HRS STMTS DENS.
PROD X ADCU 1 1977 1981 57800 0 19482 309 ASP, 99,99 NONE 0.00 (1,01586
PROD X - CLOBBER ANAL MODULE 1 1979 1981 0 0 66866 141 COB,SFOR 0.00 ASM 0,00 0,00211
PROJ X-MDPS3MISSION DATA PREP) 1 1979 1981 21250 0 157535 252 FORT VI 99.99 NONE 0.00 0,00160
PROD Y - COMMAND b DISPLAY 1 1972 1975 0 0 6640 42 ASM 69.30 JOVIAL 30,70 0,00630
PROJ Y - NAVIGATION 1 1972 1975 0 0 32980 316 JOVIAL 99,99 NONE 0.00 0.00960
PROJ Y - EXECUTIVE 1 1972 1975 0 0 6466 151 ASM 99.99 NONE 0.00 0,02335
PROD I - CAP PHASE I 1 1974 1974 0 0 3400 165 ASM 79.35 FORTRAN 20,64 0,04850
PROJ I - MSAP PHASE 1 1 1974 1974 0 0 600 70 ASM 99.99 NONE 0.00 0111666
PROJ 1 - SAP PHASE I 1 1974 1974 0 0 4450 162 ASM 0.00 U4 0.00 0.03640
PROJ I - EXEC PHASE I 1 1974 1974 0 0 12572 163 ASM 99.99 NONE 0.00 0,01296
PROJ I - CAP PHASE 11 1 1978 1978 0 0 16048 258 ASM 85.89 FORTRAN 14.41 0.01610
PROJ I - SAP PHASE II 1 1978 1978 0 0 4450 143 ASM 99,99 NONE 0,00 0,03213
PROJ 1 - EXEC PHASE 11 1 1978 1979 0 0 1228 64 ASM 99.99 NONE 0,00 0,05211
PROJ I - SIMULATOR PHASE 11 1 1978 1979 0 0 20618 192 ASM 92.09 FORTRAN 7.91 0.00930
PROJ I - SUPPORT SW PHASE II 1 1976 1979 0 0 38218 72 ASM 94.96 FORTRAN 5.03 0,00190
Prt*" E	 (FLT.	 CONTR.) 2 1978 1978 0 0 44400 381 AED 99.99 NONE 0.00 0.00860
PRDJ D	 (FLT.	 CONTR.) 2 1978 1978 0 0 43500 78 AEG 99.99 NONE 4.00 01001BO
AEM - MANPOWER ALLOC 12 N 1977 1978 89115 47855 26488 112 FORTRAN 84.00 ASM 16,00 0.00423
ISEEB-INTNATL SUN EARTH XPR 15 N 1977 1977 129299 37096 122718 88 FORTRAN 87.00 ASM 13.00 0.00070
PAS-PANORAM ATTITUDE SCAN 116 N 1977 1977 128522 72188 198965 21 FORTRAN 86.00 ASM 14.00 0.00010
SE'ASAT 110 N 1977 1978 109565 47820 109147 59 FORTRAN 76,00 ASM 24.00 0.00050
FO PRO-SMM FOCUS PROC 135 N 1978 1979 19205 11278 16997 17 FORTRAN 72.00 ASM 28.00 0100100
DEA-DYNAMICS XPLR A 136 N 1980 1980 149476 73735 140812 224 FORTRAN 67.00 ASM 13.00 0100159
DE8-DYNAMICS XPLR 8 137 N 1980 1980 134639 77997 128444 177 FORTRAN 85.00 A0 15.00 0.00138
DESIM-DYNAMICS XPLR SIM #38 N 1980 1980 31638 24964 22410 17 FORTRAN 99.99 NONE 0.00 0.00080
DEDET-DEB DETERMINISTIC 140 N 1980 1980 34532 16750 13829 49 FORTRAN 79.00 ASM 21.00 0,00290
MASNRT-MAGSAT NR REAL TIME 149 N 1980 1980 14023 3885 28900 2 FORTRAN 85.00 ASM 15.00 0.00010
MA61RC-HAOSAT IR CALIBRA 154 N J980 1980 5182 3408 2920 3 FORTRAN 99.99 NON: 0,00 0.00100
.b.
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